Grading the Hawks Management
(2011-2012)
In this entry I will be
grading GM Rick Sund’s performance during the 2011-2012 season. I’ll primarily
be focusing only on this season, but I will have to touch briefly on earlier
seasons, as well as the current situation going forward. Scouting, analysis,
and the draft will all be included in this entry even though Sund is obviously
not the only person in the front office involved in these areas.
GM
Rick Sund
Grade:
B-
Comments:
I
really don’t know what to think about Sund. It’s as if ASG decided to find
someone with experience who would be willing to work in a tough situation for
low salary and wouldn’t be a complete disaster. I would have to say that he has
fulfilled that expectation.
On the other hand, what
does Sund really do? He’s done a decent job putting together a roster
considering the restraints placed on the budget by ASG, but for the most part
he hasn’t done much other than avoid making calamitous mistakes. You almost
never hear of the Hawks being involved in talks with free agents or with other
teams in trade discussions. Then you have the indecision and the total lack of
a sense of urgency. The answer to the Josh Smith situation was to do nothing.
Sund doesn’t even know if he’ll be back next year or not.
During a recent
interview, when asked a question about the upcoming draft, Sund told AJC beat
writer Michael Cunningham that he should speak with a couple of members of his
staff who handle the draft. Sund stated that he’s a big believer in “division of
labor,” while explaining to Cunningham that the draft really isn’t his department.
Splitting up the responsibilities of running an NBA franchise is fine, and I’m
certainly not looking for the GM to be an open book with the media. However, if
the GM’s answer to a question about the draft is to ask someone else—and he’s
being honest in that response—that’s a bit too “hands off” for my tastes.
My grade for Sund
wouldn’t be as good as a B- if we were talking about the entirety of his tenure
as GM in Atlanta. For this season only, considering that we really didn’t have
any draft picks or cap room to work with, all I can really say is that it’s
disappointing he couldn’t find a creative way to improve the team in a
meaningful way. He was at least able to fill the roster with guys who could
help maintain the level of success the team has been having over the last few
years.
It’s kind of hard to
give the Hawks a fair grade in terms of scouting and analysis because they had
only 1 draft pick (very late in the 2nd round) and tight purse
strings limited the moves the team could make in free agency. The Tracy McGrady
signing was a good low risk/high reward move. Willie Green was a guy who did
help fill the “instant offense” void created by Crawford’s departure. The best
move of all may have been the signing of Ivan Johnson, a 27-year old rookie
found in the D-League. Johnson turned out to be a valuable, high energy bench
player, especially during the point in the season when the roster was really
banged up. Sund and his staff deserve credit for that find.
I thought it was
absolutely the right move to sign Erick Dampier for the rest of the season. The
Hawks needed another big body, and it became even more crucial when Zaza
Pachulia’s injury made him unavailable for the entirety of the playoffs. It’s
not like Dampier thrived when he had to fill in at points during the series with
Boston, but he was much better than I believe most people thought he ever would
be when his name was being bantered about as a possible pickup a couple of
months earlier. All the Hawks could do was get the most capable/useful big man
they could sign at the moment, and Dampier was probably that guy.
Of course, it’s quite
unfortunate that Sund turned around in mid-March and sold a 2012 2nd
round pick to Golden State. Quite obviously, there can be no explanation for
that move other than to say that it was purely a financial maneuver. I don’t
know that ownership directly ordered Sund to sell the pick immediately to the
highest bidder, but one way or another he was clearly forced into doing it in
order to get the bottom line back to the number set by ASG as the limit.
It’s unfortunate, but I
don’t know how much we can hold Sund responsible for it. I’m nothing close to
an expert on the way the NBA’s ridiculously complex financial system works (few
people are), so it’s hard for me to say, “Well, if Sund had done this instead
of this he wouldn’t have had to sell the pick.” All I can say is that the
Dampier move was necessary. Unfortunately, due to ASG’s financial restrictions,
that made the selling of the pick necessary as well.
To tell the sad truth,
it’s probably a little silly to even waste a paragraph on the loss of the 2012
2nd round pick. It certainly makes sense to point out the maneuver
as an example of the way ownership is running the team. Realistically, however,
when you’re talking about the Atlanta Hawks, counting the departure of a future
2nd round draft pick amongst a list of assets lost is probably a bit
of a stretch. I say this because the Hawks have actually made many picks in the
draft over the years and few of those selections have turned into things which
could truly be called “assets.”
If you need an example,
you don’t have to look far into the past. In fact, a good example fits right
into this explanation of Rick Sund’s grade, as it took place during the last
year. The Hawks only pick last year was at #48 and they took center Keith
Benson out of Oakland. I actually remember having some hope for the pick, as I
knew Benson from the tournament and from the prodigious stats he put up in
college.
Of course I am not a
talent evaluator or scout and I am certainly not a draft expert. Benson ended
up being cut by the team and signing with Golden State. He played 9 total
minutes in 3 games for the Warriors.
There is of course
quite a bit of luck involved in the NBA draft, particularly when you add in
things like the lottery, strength of draft class, as well as the choices made
by other teams. Once you get to the late stages of the 1st round it
becomes even less scientific, and from there through the 2nd round
it seems more and like a crapshoot.
The chances of finding
a “diamond in the rough” at the 48th pick in the draft—especially
with a draft class considered to be as weak as last year’s was—are not high. However,
some franchises seem to be more adept at pulling it off than others. So while
the Hawks can’t be crushed for not picking up a useful player at #48, I do have
to point out that it was just another missed opportunity.
The biggest problem
with Benson was his body size (a rail thin 6-11 center). Already 23 years old,
Benson’s body was unlikely to change merely due to nature. He was a project who
wouldn’t be able to contribute right away and would need to do a lot of work to
put on weight in order to have a career of any kind in the Association.
Again, it’s not like
finding a good player at #48 is easy, but it must be pointed out that two
players who have already proven capable of helping an NBA team were still
available at #48. We will probably be able to identify a few more players who
would have been better selections than Benson when looking back a few years on.
For now, we’ll just look at the two players who are already obvious.
Lavoy Allen was drafted
at #50 by the 76ers. Unlike Benson--who dominated the Summit League as an ultra
rare athletic 6-11 player for Oakland--Allen had been a solid rebounder and
good inside shooter for Temple. Allen was a 6-9 power forward and his biggest
question mark was his work ethic and motor, and perhaps that’s one reason why
the Hawks passed him up. He ended up playing well in limited minutes during 41
games in the regular season. But it was during the playoffs, particularly
against Boston, that Allen showed what he was really capable of doing.
Allen played in 41 regular
season games, making 15 starts, and averaging about 15.2 minutes. He shot .473
from the field and averaged 4.1 points and 4.1 rebounds per game. He played in
12 of Philly’s 13 playoff games, making 1 start, and averaging 19.7 minutes. He
shot .557 from the field and averaged 6.3 points, 5.0 rebounds, and nearly a
block and a steal per game. He scored in double figures in 3 of the 7 games
against Boston. Allen has already proven to be a decent scorer and rebounder,
as well as a an above average defender at the NBA level.
It’s true that the
Hawks could have used a center, as they ended up having to sign Erick Dampier,
but that was only after both Al Horford and Jason Collins went down. Plus,
Benson was a long term project. He had almost no chance of helping out this
season, while Allen—as he proved with Philly—was much closer to competing at
the NBA level.
Another player who the
Hawks had an opportunity to grab at #48 was point guard Isaiah Thomas. Again,
the Hawks did have a need at center, but it’s hard to argue that they didn’t
also need another point guard, as Crawford was gone, leaving only Jeff Teague
and the oft-injured Kirk Hinrich. If this wasn’t a clear need, the Hawks
wouldn’t have signed 24-year old rookie Donald Sloan out of the D-League.
Thomas was the most well-known
player on a Washington team that made the tournament in all 3 seasons of his
college career, winning at least 1 game in the tourney each year and making 1
Sweet 16. While Thomas was certainly the Huskies’ best player during his 3
years, a great deal of his notoriety on a national level has to be chalked up
to the fact that he shares the same name—apart from a slight difference in the
spelling—as one of the more famous basketball players of the last 30 years.
It was far from obvious
that Thomas would make it in the pros. Were it otherwise he wouldn’t have been
available, but no one would have raised much of a fuss if the Hawks had taken
the best player from a successful team from a BCS conference rather than
Benson. Like Benson, Thomas’ biggest limitation was also his size, as he was 5-foot-10
(or so), and he had a few other negative points to his game. His quickness had
allowed him to succeed both offensively and defensively in college. However,
Thomas was not a gifted outside shooter, and scoring at the basket figured to
be harder at the NBA level due to his stature. He also figured to struggle on
defense for the same reason.
Finally, despite having
the size of a true point guard, Thomas’ natural style of play was as more of a
scorer than a “facilitator.” He led the Huskies in assists in each of his 3
seasons, but he was far from a prolific assist man, and it was really a
secondary option. In fact, Thomas often played alongside another guard whose
primary option was as a passer. It was clear that Thomas would have to play
more of a traditional PG role in the NBA, and perhaps this scared off the
Hawks.
However, it really
shouldn’t have been a major issue. Presumably one of the reasons Thomas chose
to forego his senior year at Washington was that he felt he had proven he could
be more of a facilitator with a dramatic improvement in that area in his junior
year. Thomas averaged 15.5 points, 2.6 assists, and 2.6 turnovers in his
freshman season, and then 16.9 points, 3.2 assists, and 2.4 turnovers in his
sophomore campaign. In his junior year, Thomas scored 16.8 points per game, but
he averaged 6.1 assists and 3.0 turnovers, nearly doubling his assist number
with only one half of a turnover more per game, while maintaining his scoring
numbers.
Nevertheless, the Hawks
passed on Thomas, and he ended up being the last player taken in the draft,
going #60 to Sacramento. There really is no “Mr. Irrelevant” in the NBA draft,
as a dozen or more players drafted each year will likely never play a minute in
the NBA, but Thomas showed in his rookie season that he is far more relevant
than a number of the players taken before him. He played in 65 of 66 games for
the Kings, making 37 starts, and averaging 25.5 minutes per game. He shot
.448/.379/.832 while averaging 11.5 points and 4.1 assists against 1.6
turnovers.
Among qualified
rookies, Thomas was 3rd in Assist-to-Turnover ratio at 2.53; 4th
in assists per game and 3PT%; 6th in FT% and Pts/G; tied 7th
in games; 8th in minutes per game; and 10th in steals per
game.
Sac-Town’s up-tempo
style played to Thomas’ strengths and likely helped him make the adjustment,
and it’s possible that he might have had a harder time fitting into Atlanta’s
half-court offense. However, in my opinion, Thomas has shown that he is a good
enough player to at least make it and contribute regardless of the system or
situation. Benson on the other hand was waived by the Hawks after not making
the team, and while he did end up appearing in 3 games for Golden State, he
played in 6.5 fewer total minutes than Thomas averaged on a nightly basis
during 65 games this season.
Again, nobody expects
the 48th pick to be a star, but it’s almost always possible to find
someone capable of contributing. For a team with as little depth and financial
flexibility as the Hawks, every opportunity is important.
Before we move on, I do
want to return to the issue of draft picks for another moment. I know this
grade is supposed to be based solely on last year—and it is—but I want to look
at some draft pick decisions made by Sund in earlier years. Actually, some of
those moves carried over into this season, so they ought to be included in the
discussion anyway.
Sund took over for the
Hawks prior to the 2008 draft, in which—through no fault of Sund’s doing—the
Hawks did not have a pick in either round. In 2009, the Hawks had pick #19 and
#49. To go back to the “luck” element of the draft for a moment, the Hawks were
most likely greatly effected by the (seemingly) inexplicable maneuvering of
another team during the 1st round.
The Hawks were looking
for a point guard and this wasn’t a bad thing because the draft was thought to
be rich at that position. Through 17 picks Ty Lawson was still on the board. It
looked like the Hawks would have the best guy they could have hoped to get, as
Minnesota had the #18 pick, and they had already selected 2 point guards on the
day. But that assumption proved premature, as the T-Wolves drafted Lawson. It
was truly hilarious if you weren’t a Hawks fan.
Of course, I’m assuming
the Hawks would have taken Lawson. For me it was obvious, as despite the flaws
that allowed him to drop this far, he had one sure skill that would translate,
and that was blazing speed. He had also led one of the more dominant national
championship teams in recent memory at UNC. With Lawson gone, the Hawks took
Jeff Teague. In retrospect, they probably should have taken Darren Collison,
but Teague is not a pick you can crush.
And as for David Kahn
and the T-Wolves, they looked stupid at the time, and for a long time after,
but that move makes sense if Kahn thought holding Lawson’s rights was the most
valuable pick. He got a 1st round pick for the next year’s draft out
of it, and it turned out to be 2 picks higher. Unfortunately, he turned it into
Luke Babbitt, but the plan was sound.
With pick #49 the Hawks
took some guy named Sergiv Gladyr. To the best of my knowledge, Gladyr has not
been heard from since. He has never played in an NBA game. It’s not as if
there’s a long list of All-Stars that Sund could have taken instead, but
considering that he basically got nothing, AJ Price would certainly have been
better, and even Patty Mills would have offered something. Wesley Matthews—who
ended up going undrafted—would have been the best choice.
In 2010 the Hawks had
pick #24 and pick #53. At #24, the Hawks took wing Damian James out of Texas.
The pick infuriated everyone, until Sund dealt the pick to NJ shortly after for
guard Jordan Crawford (#27) and some guy named Tibor Pleiss (#31) who the Nets
drafted for the Hawks. Today, this certainly looks like a good decision, as
James has done relatively zero in the NBA over 2 seasons. Crawford, meanwhile,
did end up having some value, and there wasn’t much remaining on the board.
Landry Fields went later in the draft and Gary Neal went undrafted. Fields
might have been a better selection. At the moment, it looks like Neal certainly
would have been a better call.
Anyway, the addition of
Pleiss turned out to be meaningless, as he was quickly sold to OKC, and has yet
to play in the NBA. At #53, the Hawks took Pape Sy (again, we can look at Gary
Neal, who went undrafted). Sy played a handful of minutes in a few games during
garbage time in 2010 and was waived after failing to make the team before the
start of last season. The funny thing about Sy is that if he never plays again,
he will retire having accomplished a bizarre feat: appearing in more playoff
games than regular season games. Sy played 21 minutes over 3 games during the
2010-2011 regular season. However, the Hawks got so dusted during every game of
the 2nd round playoff series against Orlando that Sy actually made
it into all 4 games, for a total of 11 minutes.
Before the start of the
2010-2011 season, Sund had to deal with the Josh Childress situation. The
former #6 overall pick by the Hawks, Childress played his first 4 years with
Atlanta and then chose to go to Europe rather than play another game for the
team. After 2 years he was ready to come back and the Hawks still held his
rights and couldn’t afford him. Sund traded him to the Suns for a 2012 2nd
round pick.
Late in the 2010-2011
season, Sund dealt Mike Bibby, Mo Evans, Jordan Crawford, and a 2011 1st
round pick to Washington in exchange for Kirk Hinrich and Hilton Armstrong.
Essentially, the deal was 2 1st round picks for Hinrich (the other 1st
round pick being Crawford). Armstrong was worthless and Bibby and Evans were
just dealt to clear salary and space. Hinrich was instrumental in the 1st
round upset of Orlando, and had he not been injured during the series with
Chicago it might have gone 7 games. He also served a purpose as a backup guard
during this past year. However, with his time now up in Atlanta, it seems like
a lot to have given up.
The trade of the 1st
round pick left the Hawks with only the 48th pick last year, and as
already discussed, they took Benson, who was waived without ever playing for
the team. Then Sund sold the pick acquired in the Childress trade to GS for
cash.
If you factor in the
draft day trade and the Childress deal, Sund has had 3 1st round
picks and 5 2nd round picks to work with during his time in Atlanta.
Only Teague remains. 3 of the 2nd round picks never played; 2 more
were sold; and 2 of the 1st round picks were traded for Hinrich. The
Hawks have a 1st and 2nd round pick in the upcoming
draft.
If you look back on it,
I’m tempted to believe that the draft picks which resulted in Gladyr, Sy,
Pleiss, and Benson had as much to do with not wanting to have to pay a 2nd
round pick as anything else. Drafting the foreign players obviously saves money
because you don’t have to pay them and they don’t take up a spot on the active
roster. You might be able to sell the pick/player, or just cut bait. Again,
Sund is obviously just playing by ASG’s rules in those cases, but it’s hard to
accept that there was no better option than what he’s come up with.
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